Viewed abstractly, the data from a longitudinal epidemiologic study consists of a string of numbers. These numbers represent for each study subject a series of empirical measurements (for example, measurement at monthly intervals of a subject's exposure level, smoking rate, employment status and vital status). In the analysis stage, calculations are performed on these strings of numbers. Based on the results of these calculations, causal inferences are drawn. For example, an investigator might conclude that the analysis provides strong evidence for "a direct effect of arsenic on lung cancer mortality controlling for the intermediate variable cigarette smoking". The nature of the relationship between the English sentences expressing the investigator's causal inferences and the computer calculations performed on the strings of numbers has been obscure. Since the numerical strings and the computer algorithm applied to them are well-defined mathematical objects, it would be important to provide formal mathematical definitions for the English sentences expressing the investigator's causal inferences that agree well with our informal intuitive understanding. In the published paper [1] , we developed such a formal theory of causal inference in epidemiologic studies.
In this theory causal questions that could be asked in English concerning the study population become mathematical conjectures about the population causal parameters of a causally interpreted structured tree graph (CISTG) as defined on p. 1422 of the original paper. In Ref. [1] , we show that, for randomized CISTGs (as defined by equation 4.5 of Ref. [1] ), a subset of the population causal parameters, i.e. the G-causal parameters, could be empirically estimated. We will show in Sections AD. 1-AD.4 of this addendum that, under certain assumptions, the G-causal parameters of certain CISTGs that are not R CISTGs can also be empirically estimated. These CISTGs differ from R CISTGs in that, in a sense described more fully below, they are randomized with respect to one outcome (e.g., mortality) but not with respect to another outcome [e.g. employment history].
In Section AD.5 we provide a formulation of the competing risks problem that differs slightly from the formulation given in Section 12 of Ref. [1] . This formulation is more in line with the approach we adopted in Ref. [1] .
In Section AD.6 we develop other, alternative, comparability assumptions that again allow for the estimation of the G-causal parameters of CISTGs that are not R CISTGs.
In Section AD.7, we show that when risk factors determine exposure, non-differential misclassification of exposure can lead to bias even under the null hypothesis of no causal effect of exposure on mortality.
In Section AD.8 we extend our methods to studies with continuous exposure, covariate and outcome measures.
AD.1. MCISTGs RANDOMIZED WITH RESPECT TO SURVIVAL ONLY
It follows from the definitions given in Section 4 of the original paper that, as an R MCISTG, MCISTG 3.4 of Ref. [1] is randomized with respect to both future employment and survival history in the following sense. For each generalized treatment G 3"*, for all right circumference points "is through which the highlighted subgraph "G 34'' by G 3.4 . Suppose now that the above italicized statement is false (i.e., MCISTG 3.4 is not an R MCISTG), but that the italicized statement remains true if we replace the words "employment and survival history" by "survival history." We then say that MCISTG 3.4 is randomized with respect to survival history (but not with respect to employment history). We show, in Section AD.2 below, that it is still the case that S (tlG 34) = S (tI"G 3.4,,) , although p [L (L)f G 3.4] ~ p [L (ts)l"G 3. 4,,] . In other words, the G-computation algorithm can be used to compute the survival (but not the employment history) curve that would be observed in the controlled trial represented by G 3'4. Furthermore, S('isjsIG 3"4) ~ S('isJs) and 7(.islG 34) # y(.i,) (i.e. the conclusions of Theorem 4.1 of Ref. [1] do not hold).
In a true randomized study (whether an ordinary designed or an alternative designed randomized trial), randomization is with respect to all outcomes (since it is physical randomization). Thus, it is only necessary to extend our formal theory of causal inference to include, say, MCISTGs randomized with respect to survival if, in an observational study, an investigator would hold an opinion such as MCISTG 3.4 is randomized with respect to survival but not with respect to employment history. In Section AD.3, we dissect the beliefs an investigator must have in order to hold the opinion that an MCISTG is randomized with respect to survival but not with respect to employment history. We show that these beliefs may well approximate the actual beliefs of an investigator.
In Section AD.4 we will review some of the theorems given in the original paper that refer to R CISTGs and determine which remain true for MCISTGs randomized with respect to survival (only).
AD.2. FORMAL DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding to the definition of a CISTG randomized with respect to survival, we review and dissect the definitions of a CISTG and SCISTG.
AD.2(a) Dissection of a SCISTG
It follows from the definitions of a CISTG and SCISTG given in Section 4 of Ref. [1] that a PISTG is a CISTG or even a SCISTG only if we can assume a great deal of non-identifiable structure underlying the empirically observable PISTG. For example, a PISTG is a SCISTG only if each subject's covariate and vital status history would be uniquely defined under each of the controlled trials defined by the generalized treatments of the PISTG. Furthermore, under each such generalized treatment, the covariate history that a subject would have experienced had they not died is also well-defined. At times one may wish to make causal inferences and yet append less non-identifiable structure onto a PISTG than that contained in an SCISTG (although since we treat all causal inferences as counterfactual in nature, some non-identifiable structure must be appended to an empirical PISTG). Examples of how this can be accomplished are considered below.
Definition
A PISTG A is an SCISTGL(GI A) if (1) each subject in the superpopulation has a uniquely defined covariate and survival history lying on the PISTG in the hypothetical controlled study defined by G~eG A, where the hypothetical study defined by Gi 4 is as described in the last sentence on p. 1421 and the first sentence on p. 1422 of Ref. [1] and (2) in any study, a subject's covariate and survival history through any time ts only depends on the treatments received by that subject prior to ts and not on the treatments received by any other subject. In this definition, a subject's covariate history when treated with G~ is not assumed to be defined after his time of death. The "L" in SCISTGL is to reflect the fact that, in comparison with an SCISTG, less non-identifiable structure is being assumed, since a subject's covariate history is not defined after time of death.
A PISTG A is an SCISTGL if it is an SCISTGL(G() for all G~eG A.
A PISTG A is an SCISTGL(z) it is an SCISTGL(G0 for all Gf~ c G A. terminates. Numbers in brackets are standard labels. Other numbers represent the number of subjects with the covariate and vital status hstory represented by the corresponding intra-or internodal lines.
925

Definition
An SCISTGL A is a CISTGL if all PISTGs B coarser than A are SCISTGLs. We can provide additional structure so that, as in Section 12D of Ref.
[1], we may discuss the effect of a generalized treatment in a world with death removed.
We will require the following development. For any given PISTG, an arbitrary internodal line • isjs and the node "isjs(ts+t) on which it terminates would appear, when standardly labelled, as in Fig. AD.1. (In this figure, the right circumference point "is from which "isjs arises is not shown.) The number of intranodal and internodal lines in the node "isjs(t,+~) were chosen arbitrarily. The numbers on the graph in Fig. AD . 1 represent the number of study subjects with the corresponding covariate and survival history. Note that 34-30 = 4 subjects with the history represented by the internodal line .isjs died in the interval t, to ts+t.
For convenience and without loss of generality, assume that all subjects dying in the interval (ts,t,+~] die at ts+t -tr, 0 < tr < It~+l -tsl. Then we can consider a new PISTG, which we shall call PISTG A A, which replaces each subunit on the PISTG of the form given in Fig 
Remark AD.O
In the definition of an STG on p. 1406 of Ref. [1] it was assumed that successive generations on an STG are labelled tl, t2, t3, etc. Therefore, technically 2 has successive generations consecutively labelled t~, t2, t3, etc. Henceforth, whenever we refer to PISTG A A we will be referring to the PISTG associated with the relabelled Fig. AD. 2. This relabelling is necessary because, for example, S(tklG# ~) is given by equation (4.7) of Ref. [1] only if AA is a PISTG (i.e., only if successive generations are labelled t~, t2, t3, etc).
Any "G~" on PISTG A has a corresponding generalized treatment "Gl Aa'' = (G~,D) on PISTG AA which we describe in words as "remain D (i.e., stay alive) and receive r.A,, It follows from the definition of an SCISTGL that the survival and covariate history of the population when treated with G ~ will be well defined in RD (the world with death removed) only if PISTG AA is an SCISTGL(G~A = (G~,/5)).
Remark
Note it follows from (2) in our definition of an SCISTGL(G¢ A) that if, say, death from heart disease is removed time t, this does not influence the development of angina at any time tk less than time ts. See the bracketed paragraph on p. 1496 of Ref. [1] for further discussion of this point.
Let r ~ be the set of all G~ A of form (G~,/5). Then we have:
Lemma
A PISTG A is an SCISTG (as defined in Section 4 of the original paper) if and only if PISTG A is an SCISTGL and PISTG AA is an SCISTGL(za).
Proof Immediate from the definitions. 
Remark
As discussed in Section 4 of Ref. [1] , a PISTG A is a CISTG if and only if PISTG A and all coarser PISTGs B are SCISTGs.
Remark AD. 1
The coarser PISTG formed from PISTG A A by having at each time ts+~ -a on Fig. AD .2 the D and/3 subjects in each node on separate intranodal lines, we shall also designate as PISTG A. We do this because the corresponding generalized treatments of this coarser graph formed from PISTG A A and of the PISTG A shown in Fig. AD . 1 represent the same hypothetical studies. In fact, until Section AD.5, whenever we refer to PISTG .4, we will be referring to the coarser PISTG formed from PISTG A A (represented by 
Remark
Note levels of death status (Dvs/)) can be treatments on PISTG A A but are outcomes on PISTG A.
Notational conventions
Since we shall only be concerned with the generalized treatment of A A of the form (G ~,/)) we adopt the convention that when we write G ~A we are referring to the generalized treatment (G ~,/)).
AD.2(b ). Formal Definitions of a CISTG Randomized with Respect to Survival Definition
Given an observed study represented by an OPISTG A and given another STG C that is a CISTG for the study population, S(t k ]G c, [. i,j~] ) ----p(D > tk IG c, [" isjf] ) is defined to be the probability of survival past tk for the subset of the study population who were in [. isj~] in the observed study when treated with the generalized treatment G c in a hypothetical controlled trial. (STGs C and A may or may not be identical.)
Remark
If, in the above definition, we replace [.i,j:] by ' ~,j," .4 to give p (D > tkIGC," isj:) then, following the notational convention described in the second paragraph of p. 1422 in the original paper, we would need to replace the expression "in the observed study" by the expression "in the hypothetical study defined by G c,,.
In the above definition STG C need actually only be an SCISTGL(GC). 
Definition
then CISTG A is an R(D,G:) CISTG, which is to be read as CISTG A is randomized with respect to death (equivalently, survival) history for generalized treatment G~.
Remark
In the above definition STG A need only be an SCISTGL(G:). Note that equation (1) 
In the above definition CISTG A need only be an SCISTGL(TA).
Definition
We say a CISTG is an R(D) CISTG if equation (1) holds for all G6G A.
Remark
The CISTG need only be an SCISTGL.
Definition
Given a CISTG A and a collection of covariate histories I~ (as defined in the first paragraph of Appendix G and at the top of p. 1510 of the original paper), we say a CISTG A is an R(Is B, G~) ,, .B ,, We read R(Is B, Gt A) CISTG A as CISTG A if equation (1) 
since, to have employment history L(tk), one must be alive at tk. It follows immediately from this discussion that the following lemma holds.
Lemma
If CISTG A is an R(Is n) CISTG for some Is n then it is an R(D) CISTG provided D is an outcome rather than a treatment on the CISTG.
Definitions
Given a PISTG A, a set of covariate histories Is s, and a finer SCISTGL(r Q) Q, zQcG Q, and given any. i: on a particular "G~" if, for all "G] 2'' = z o that pass through • i: (i.e. for all "G ~" such that 
Remark
• .A and .i~ be the covariate histories • i: and .i~ e in the standard labeling of PISTG A and Let t, Q, respectively• If in equation (la) • ik s =" i~, then we could write • i~ in place of • it =" ig since, because Q is finer than A, (1) any .i~ is the union of .ig and (2) for a given "G~" and a given
• i~, there is a unique "iAk~ ['i~] fq"G~ "'.
For any SCISTGL(G~) let .i:(G~) be a subject's covariate history .i: when treated with G~.
Then equation (la) can be rewritten
(1 b)
Definition
Given an SCISTGL(GI4), sets of covariate histories I s and I~, and a finer SCISTGL(z 0) Q, we say that A is an R[(Is B, IsrlQ(~Q)), G1 a] SCISTGL(G~) if for any "t~'A~G~,A and for all "G~"Cz Q passing through .z,,'A 
Example
Consider a PISTG A that is a fundamental PISTG of an alternative designed randomized trial (or a double blind ordinary design randomized trial) as defined in Section 4F of the original paper. Then it follows from the fact that physical randomization was employed in the trial that (1) not only is PISTG A an R(IJ) SCISTGL but (2) for any PISTG Q finer than PISTG A that (an investigator subjectively assumes) is an SCISTGL(, t>) Q, PISTG A is also an R(I~,IJIQ(,°))
SCISTGL.
Lemma
An SCISTG A is an R SCISTG (as defined in Section 4F of Ref. 
If exposure is not a causal risk factor for L (which is a statement about SCISTGL 3.4A) and
If (1) 
Proof. Straight from the definitions.
Note if we replace R(D) CISTG (at both occurrences) with R CISTG in the above theorem, then the theorem is true in the =~ direction but not in the other direction.
Our main result is:
Theorem AD. 1 If CISTG A is an R(D, Gi 4) CISTG, then S(tIG'~)= S(tI"Gf").
We will require the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
If A is an R(D, G~) CISTG then, for all "isj~G~, CISTG A ('i~js(ts+l) ) is an RID, G~<isJ~",+o~ CISTG where G~ ~'i,js<',+')) is subgraph G~ restricted to STG A ('i, js(t,+O) .
Proof. Immediately from the definitions.
Proof of Theorem AD. 1. By induction. We assume it is true for a CISTG of S generations and show that it is true for one of S + 1 generations.
(from the definition of an CISTG). Now
by Lemma AD. 1 and the assumption the theorem is true for CISTGs of S generations. Therefore,
where the first equality follows from equations (2) and (3) and the second equality follows from equation (4.7) of the original paper. Finally, it is trivial to show that the theorem holds for a CISTG of two generations and this completes the proof.
Remark
The theorem holds for SCISTGL(G~) replacing CISTG. Note that equation (3) in the above proof would not hold for an SCISTGL(G:) if condition (2) in the definition of an SCISTGL(G~) had been excluded from that definition.
Corollary
If CISTG A is an R(Is B, Gf) CISTG then p(..B A
~, IG I ) = p(. i~["G':"). Proof
The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem AD. I, when we substitute p [.igl-] for S(t I').
Since an R CISTG (defined in Section 4 of Ref. [1] ) is an R(I~) CISTG the above corollary applied to an R(Is A) CISTG, in conjunction with the following Lemma, immediately provides a proof of Theorem 4.1 in the original paper that is much simpler than that given in Appendix C.
Y(" L [G ~ ) and S(. isj:) = S(" isj~IG ~) Proof
Straightforward from the definitions.
AD.3. AN EXAMPLE OF AN R(D,GI) MCISTG
In this subsection we consider, via an example, the prior beliefs an investigator would need to hold in order to assume that an MCISTG is an R(D, G~) MCISTG but not an R MCISTG. The purpose of this example is simply to indicate the type of questions one must ask oneself to determine whether one believes an MCISTG is an R(D, Gt) MCISTG.
Example 1
Suppose that in the workplace study represented by MPISTG 3.4 of Ref. [1] the chemical agent under study was a known eye-irritant. Suppose further that the investigator believed the following six assumptions held:
1. Subjects differ (possibly on a genetic basis) in their sensitivity to the eye-irritating effects of a wide variety of substances. 2. Certain subjects who knew (from past experience) or suspected that they had "sensitive eyes" tended to select themselves into unexposed jobs. 3. If subjects with sensitive eyes were to be forced to remain in high exposure jobs while at work, many would rapidly leave the workforce in order to avoid further eye irritation. 4. Equally in jobs with high and with zero exposure to the agent under study, there is additional exposure to an inert non-reactive dust. This dust causes some eye irritation in subjects with "sensitive eyes." Occasionally this irritation is sufficient to make the sensitive subjects leave work, although the degree of irritation is much less that that associated with the highly reactive exposure under study. 5. Among a subset of workers with identical exposure histories through t~_ i and employment history through is, those workers who know or believe their eyes to be "sensitive" do not differ at ts on other unmeasured risk factors for death from other workers. Furthermore, "eye-sensitivity" (known or believed) is not itself a causal risk factor for death when controlling for exposure and employment history.
6. Conditional on exposure history through ts_ 1 and employment history through ts, the exposure level received at work at ts is distributed independently of any subject characteristic unassociated with eye-sensitivity.
It is plausible that a particular investigator would be willing to assume that these 6 assumptions (approximately) held. We now show that, when properly formalized, these 6 conditions would imply that MCISTG 3.4 is not an R MCISTG but is an R(D, G ~4) MCISTG for G ~.4 of "if at work, receive zero exposure," provided that employment history is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for exposure history. If employment is an independent causal risk factor, then, in general, MCISTG 3.4 will not be an R(D, Gt) MCISTG for any generalized treatment GI.
(A). Under Assumptions (1)- (6) above, MCISTG 3.4 is not an R[L(ts)] MCISTG since, by Assumptions 2 and 3, in a hypothetical study in which all subjects received high exposure at fi, the rate of development of eye-irritation, and therefore the rate of leaving work at t2, would be greater in the subset of the population who received zero exposure at tl (in the observed study) than in the subject who received high exposure at t~ (in the observed study).
(B). MCISTG 3.4 will not be an R [L(ts) , G~] MCISTG even for the generalized treatment G~ "if at work receive zero exposure" since, by Assumptions 2 and 4, the above italicized statement will still be true under this generalized treatment. (Assumption 4 implies that the eyes of some sensitive subjects will be sufficiently irritated by the inert dust present in unexposed jobs that they will leave work at t2. Assumption 2 says that, in the observed study, sensitive subjects selected themselves into unexposed jobs at t~ .) (C). When leaving work is an independent causal risk factor for death, MCISTG 3.4 is not an R[D, Gt] MCISTG for the generalized treatment G~ "if at work receive zero exposure". This follows, since, as just shown in (B), in the hypothetical study "if at work, receive zero exposure", the rate of leaving work at t2, and thus (when L is a causal risk factor) the rate of death at times greater than t2, will be greater in the subgroup who were unexposed at t~ (in the observed study) than in the subgroup who received high exposure at tl. Thus, if MCISTG 3.3 were an R(D) MCISTG, we could estimate the direct effect of exposure controlling for employment history, but we would be unable to estimate the overall effect of exposure (i.e., the G-causal parameters of MCISTG 3.4)
Remark AD.2
Note in (C) the subset receiving high exposure at t~ differs at fi on unmeasured risk factors for death from the subset receiving zero exposure at h (since these the subsets differed in the proportion of their members with the unmeasured causal risk factor for leaving work, sensitive eyes, and leaving work is itself a causal risk factor for death). That is, when employment history is a causal risk factor, "eye sensitivity" is a direct causal risk factor for death when controlling for exposure (but not controlling for employment history). But, by Assumption (5), eye sensivity is not a causal risk factor for death when controlling for exposure and employment history. It is clear that a more careful and formal statement of Assumptions (5) and (6) would be helpful. Assumptions (5) and (6) taken together are meant to formally imply that, for any right circumference point
the future survival history of the subset receiving high exposure at t, (in the observed study) is the same as that of the subset receiving zero exposure when both subsets are treated with any generalized treatment G 3"3 = [E(ts), L(ts)] that passes through • i~ 34, [i.e. E(ts) and L(ts) have initial segments E(ts_~) and L(L), respectively]. That is, in our notation, for all
for any E(ts) and L(ts) with initial segments E(t~_~) and L(L), respectively. When equation (4) holds (i.e. Assumptions 5 and 6 hold) we say that MCISTG 3.4 is randomized with respect to "mortality (or survival) when controlling for employment history" which we write as MCISTG is an R[DIL(ts) ] MCISTG.
More generally, let PISTGs A, Q and covariate history Is n be as defined in Appendix G of the original paper. Further suppose that PISTG A and Q are CISTGs.
Definition
We say that CISTG A is randomized with respect to survival when controlling for IS for a given G~ (written as CISTG A is an R(DIIs B, G~)) if for each .is B and each .i~ G¢ such that
[-i~] c ['i~],S[tklG~ = (G~,'i~),['ij:]] = S[tklG~ = (G~ i n~ f i :,All
," SJ,t' s.]s JJ, where -i~ is the initial part of. is B.
(That is, given a CISTG A and a finer CISTG Q, CISTG A is an R(DII~,G~) if and only if it is an R[Is°IQ(zQ). G#] CISTG for zQ= {GQ; GQ= (GA,.isB)}. Here we are thinking of I ° as the covariate history that takes the value 0 while an individual is alive and 1 thereafter.)
Definition
A CISTG A is an R(DIIs n) CISTG if it is an R(DIIs n, G~) CISTG for all G~G A.
(D). Given Assumptions 5 and 6 hold, if employment history is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for exposure, then MCISTG 3.4 is an R[D, GI] MCISTG for the G1 "if at work receive zero exposure." This seems intuitively clear since, in the hypothetical study "if at work receive zero exposure", although, by (B) above, among subjects who were in a given • i3-4E"G1 '' (in the observed study), the subset who received high exposure at ts (in the observed study) will differ on future L-history from the subset who received zero exposure at ts, these subsets will not differ in survival history when L is not a causal risk factor and equation 4 holds. Formally, (D) is a consequence of the following theorem:
Given MCISTG A, Q and covariate history Is B as defined in Appendix G, if MCISTG A is an R(DIIg, Gf) MCISTG and for all subjects i, all pairs of covariate histories "iSs~, .i~, and all tk
then MCISTG A is an R(D, GI A) MCISTG. Proof. Straight from the definitions. In our special case with A = 3.4, Q = 3.3, .isB= L(ts) and G34= "if at work, receive zero exposure" (which, for MCISTG 3.4, is equivalent to "always receive zero exposure"), equation 5 can be written
S(tk, G~ "3 = [E(ts) =-O, L, (ts)], G~ 3 = [E(ts) =-O, L2(ts)]
By definition equation (6) holds if L is not a causal risk factor controlling for exposure history.
(E). Even when L is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for exposure, if exposure is a causal risk factor for death controlling for L, then in general MCISTG 3.4 will not be an ./3.4 e:: "g7 3.4'~ R[D, G~ "4] MCISTG for any G~ '4 such that, for some ,s = ,~ , s >I 2, the treatment at t, is "high exposure." To see why, consider the generalized treatment "if at work receive high exposure." In a hypothetical study represented by that generalized treatment, the survival curve of the subset who were unexposed at fl (in the observed study) will differ from the survival curve of the subset who received high exposure at fl (in the observed study). This reflects the fact that by Assumptions 2 and 3, in the hypothetical study, the proportion of workers remaining at work at t2 (and thus receiving high exposure at t2) is greater among the subset who received high exposure at t~ (in the observed study) than among the subset who received zero exposure at ft. Therefore, equation (5) will be false for G~ = G~ '4 of "if at work receive high exposure" even though L is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for exposure.
Remark
Suppose we replaced MCISTG 3.4 and 3.3 with MCISTG 8.1 and F8.1 of Ref. [1] (because subjects who are off work could be exposed to the agent under study). Then it follows from Theorem AD.2 that, if MCISTG 8.1 is an R(DIL(ts)) MCISTG and L is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for exposure, then MCISTG 8.1 is an RID, G~] MCISTG for any G~ t such that, at each t,, all subjects are assigned the identical exposure level, e(t,), regardless of their past employment history.
(F). Suppose neither exposure nor L-history are causal risk factors for death when controlling for the other. Then, if MCISTG 3.4 is an R(DIL(ts)) MCISTG, i.e. Assumptions (5) and (6) hold, then MCISTG 3.4 is an R(D) MCISTG. This is intuitively clear since, in terms of survival, it is no longer matters that, in the hypothetical study "if at work receive high exposure", the subset who received high exposure at t~ in the observed study will differ on subsequent exposure and employment history [see (E) above] from the subset who received zero exposure at t~. More formally, if neither exposure nor L are causal risk factors controlling for the other, then the sharp null hypothesis holds for MCISTG 3.3. Therefore, equation 5 holds for all Gi 4 with A = 3.4.
Implications for analysis
The results described in (A)-(F) have the following implications for analysis. Whenever we are confronted by an occupational study represented by MCISTG 3.4 and we believe (as would an investigator who held Assumptions 1-6 above) that (1) conditional on exposure history through ts_t and employment history through ts, exposure at work is received (a) at random at t, with respect to unknown subject characteristics that are direct causal risk factors for death controlling for employment history but (b) not at random with respect to unmeasured risk factors for employment history [i.e. MCISTG 3.4 is an R(DIL(ts) ) MCISTG but not an R MCISTG] and (2) employment history is not a causal risk factor controlling for exposure; then we can validly test the null hypothesis of no direct effect of exposure controlling for employment history [and thus by (2) the null hypothesis of no overall effect of exposure on mortality] by utilizing the G-null test for MCISTG 3.4 as described in Section 6 of the original paper.
This reflects the fact that, under the above null hypothesis, MCISTG 3.4 will be an R(D) MCISTG [see (F) above] and, in addition, the G-null hypothesis (and therefore the "G"-null hypothesis) will hold for MCISTG 3.4.
If the G-null test rejects because the G-null hypothesis of MCISTG 3.4 is false, we cannot then estimate the effect parameter 34 34 We can still make the causal comparisons in the sense that S(t 13.4)-S(tlG 3"a) is estimable and is a population causal parameter as defined on p. 1422 of the original paper. Here S(tl3.4) is the empirical survival curve for the entire study population of MPISTG 3.4.
S(t,Gf
AD.4. THEOREM REVIEW
We consider which of the theorems and lemmas of Ref. [1] that are true for an R CISTG continue to hold for an R(D) CISTG.
An R(D) SCISTG that is not an R SCISTG cannot be the stage 0 PL sufficient reduction of an ordinary designed double-blind randomized trial in which data on treatment assignment is missing since, by Theorem 7.1 of Ref. [1] , any such stage 0 reduction would be an R SCISTG. In general, all the results of Section 11 go through even if, by Assumption G.2, we were referring to the assumption that OPISTG 11.1 is an R(D) OCISTG.
Remark
In Section 8D.3 we relied heavily on conclusions (a) and (b) of Lemmas 8.7 and 8.8 in determining how we would use empirical data to draw causal inferences about the direct effect of exposure when controlling for an indpendent causal risk factor such as cigarette smoking. Supose suppositions (1) and (2) of Lemma 8.7 hold and L is an independent causal risk factor for death. Would it then be plausible for an investigator to believe that MCISTG 3.4 were an R(D) MCISTG but not an R MCISTG? Suppose suppositions (1) and (2) of Lemma 8.8 held and cigarette smoking was an independent causal risk factor for death. Would it then be plausible to believe that MCISTG C8.3 were an R(D) MCISTG but not an R MCISTG? If it were plausible, we would need to discuss how we would draw inferences from empirical data when we can use conclusion (c) but cannot use conclusions (a) and (b) of Lemmas 8.7 and 8.8.
However, as we now show, it is not very plausible. Consider first CISTG 3.4. Similar results will obtain for CISTG C8.3. If one does not believe CISTG 3.4 is an R CISTG because exposure is not given at random with respect to L-history, it is plausible, aswe have seen in section AD.3, that one may believe that exposure was given at random with respect to mortality when controlling for L-history, i.e. that MCISTG 3.4. were an R[DIL(ts)] CISTG. We restrict further attention to this randomization assumption since no other randomization assumption appears to us to be very plausible. We show below that even when (A) MCISTG 3.4 is an R(DIL(ts)) MCISTG but is not an R MCISTG; (B) employment history is an independent causal risk factor for death; (C) exposure is not a causal risk factor for death controlling for L-history and (D) exposure is not a causal risk factor for L, To see this, consider the study represented in Fig. AD.3 . Suppose the true state of nature generating the data was as in Table 1 . Subjects who received H at tl were Type I subjects. Subjects who received 0 at t~ were Type II subjects. The state of nature represented in Table 1 satisfies conditions (A)-(D) above. It follows from Table 1 that all subjects who received exposure H at tl in the observed trial are dead at t 3 when treated with G AD' 3 = [H] . In contrast, all subjects who received zero exposure at tl in the observed study will remain alive at t3 when treated with GAD'3 = [H]. Therefore, MCISTG AD.3 is not an R(D) MCISTG.
Implications for analysis
When (A)-(D), just above, hold we would be unable to construct an empirical test of the joint null hypothesis that (1) E is not an independent causal risk factor for death and (2) E is not a causal risk factor for L, since conclusion c of Lemma 8.7 will be false (in addition to conclusion a and b) That is, under the above joint null hypothesis, the "G"-null hypothesis for MCISTG 3.4, in contrast with the G-null hypothesis, will not hold and thus we cannot employ the G-null test for MCISTG 3.4. On the other hand, if employment history were not a causal risk factor, MCISTG 3.4 would be an R(D) MCISTG and we could use the "G"-null test for MCISTG 3.4 to test whether exposure was an independent causal risk factor for death. (Note that when conditions A, C and D hold and MCISTG 3.3 is not randomized, exposure will, in general, be an independent (empirical) population risk factor for death controlling for L-history whether or not L is an independent causal risk factor.)
AD.5. AN IMPROVED TREATMENT OF COMPETING RISKS
In this section we give a slightly different formalization of the competing risks problems that brings it more in line with the remainder of Ref. [1] . We discuss how this reformulation differs from the approach given in Section 12 of Ref. [1] . Consider, as in Section 12, an MPISTG A in which exact death times are available for causes of death D~ and D2 but data on other convariates are available only at times t~ ..... ts. D2 represents all causes of death other than D~. Specifically consider again, as in Section AD.2(a) a study represented by a PISTG A with an arbitrary subunit as shown in Fig. AD. 1 except that additional information on cause of and exact time of death is available. We then consider a new PISTG, PISTG A *, which replaces each subunit of the form given in Fig 
Remark AD.3
The coarser MPISTG formed from MPISTG A * by placing the DE and D E subjects in each node on separate intranodal lines, we can also designate as MPISTG A (see Remark AD.1). In fact, henceforth, whenever we refer to PISTG ,4, we will be referring to the coarser PISTG formed from PISTG A * (represented by the relabelled Fig. AD.4) . On MPISTG A*, D2-status can be a treatment while D:status is always an outcome.
Remark
PISTG A * is data dependent in the sense that size and number of the ~i depend on the pattern of observed deaths in the study sample. This turns out not to create any major difficulties although properly, we should be representing the entire superpopulation on our MPISTG. To do so, and to keep deaths from D I and D 2 from occurring in the same node, the ~r i would have to be infinitesimal. A proper treatment would require the introduction of multivariate counting processes in continuous time for the failures DI and D2.
Assuming that on PISTGs A * and A (as defined in Remark AD.3) the a i are infinitesimal, the distinction between 2 and 7, given in Section 12 of Ref. [1] , disappears.
Remark AD.4
If MPISTG A * is an SCISTGL(z*), where ~* is the set of G~" of the form G a* = (GA,D2), then, by definition of an SCISTGL (z*), So,(tIG~') =-p(D~ > tlG~') =-p(D~ > tIG~,RD2) is a well defined curve. It is the survival experience of the population when treated with G~ in a world in which cause of death D2 has been removed.
In the above we have used the following notational convention.
Notational convention
Since we shall only be concerned with the generalized treatments of A * of the form (Gi~,/52), we adopt the convention that when we write G#" we are referring to the generahzed treatment (af,b9.
Let PISTG CA * be the coarser CISTG formed from PISTG A * such that at each t,, s ¢ (1,.. S), no two internodal lines arise from a single right circumference point. (Deaths from causes D 2 remain treatments.) If PISTG CA* is an SCISTGL(G ca" =(D2), where GCa'=(/52) is the generalized treatment "never die from cause D2", then we say that the outcome of each subject on PISTG A is well defined in RD2. This is what we assumed in the second paragraph on p. 1489 of Ref. [1] . We adopt the notational convention that whenever we refer to the generalized treatment G c4. we are referring to the generalized treatment G c4. = (D2). It follows from Remark AD.4 that it is not necessary that PISTG CA * be an SCISTGL(G c4") in order that p(D~ > tIGf,RD2) be well defined.
Example
For PISTG 3.4 of Ref. [1] , it is not necessary that we assume that nature would uniquely determine each subject's exposure at work in RD 2 in order that each subject has a well defined outcome when treated with "if at work, receive high exposure" in RD 2. 
Remark
Proof. Directly from the corollary to Theorem AD. 1. In contrast, the conditions given in Section 12 of Ref. [1] under which the parameter of interest So,(tsIG~,RD2) would equal the empirical parameter S*~(LI"Gf") contained additional unnecessary non-identifiable structure. Specifically, in Theorem 12A. 1, we required the following three conditions: (1) MPISTG A was an FR MCISTG RD2; (2) the full-independence assumption held and (3) each individual had a deterministic covariate and vital status history that lay on the PISTG A in RD~. (This last condition was assumed throughout Section 12.) Condition (1), like condition (3), requires that MPISTG CA* be an SCISTGL(GC4*). Furthermore, condition (2) would, in general, only hold if PISTG CA * were an R(I~, G c4.) SCISTGL (GC4").
AD.6. COMPETING RISKS--SOME EXAMPLES
Theorem 12.A.2 of Ref. [1] provides conditions under which ¢, A, , ?:D, (t, I G~ ) = ?:o, (t, IGf, RD2) = ?:o, (tslG:') .
In the original paper no concrete examples are provided to make clear what beliefs an investigator would have to hold in order to assume that equation (8) were true. We now give a simple example in which equation (8) 
First we note that the following theorem is true.
Theorem
If, for either k = 1 or k = 2, for all s I> 1, and for all .tsj~' .AeG~A 
¥D t~k~s I v I 1"
Therefore, for equation (9) to hold, we require that equation (10) Consider a study of the effect of quitting cigarette smoking on lung cancer (Dr) with a PISTG, as detailed as the data, given in Fig. AD .5.1-status is a covariate that records the results of a clinical evaluation of the subject's functional status by a disability expert, l(l) is (is not) disabled. 1 subjects include a number of subjects disabled due to (unrecorded for data analysis) clinical lung cancer and others disabled due to (unrecorded) cardiac disease. Now assume it is empirically the case that (1) the distribution of smoking rate at t2, conditional on the smoking rate at tl, is independent of 1-status at t2 and (2) controlling for smoking history, the incidence of both death from D2 at t 3 and death from D 1 at t4 is greater among 1 subjects than among | subjects. (This accords with the assumption that 1 individuals are disabled.) It follows that equation (11) with A = AD.5 will be false for both G~ "5 "smoke at t2" and G2 AD5 "do not smoke at t2".
Remark
It is unlikely that assumption (1) would actually hold, since one might expect more disabled individuals to give up smoking at t~ than nondisabled individuals. At present, for pedagogic reasons we accept Assumption (1). Below we shall relax it.
Suppose now that an investigator is willing to assume (at least approximately) that PISTG AD.5 is an R MCISTG, i.e., controlling for 1-status, change in cigarette smoking is unrelated to unmeasured risk factors for death from lung cancer or heart disease.
Then, because of Assumption (1), it follows from Theorem F.3 of Ref. [1] that the causal melded stage 0 reduction of CISTG AD.5, say CISTG SOAD.5, which eliminates data on 1-status by having the node at t: contain but one intranodal line from which the internodal lines and c and arise is an R CISTG.
Consider the generalized treatment "smoke at t2" of PISTG AD.5, which we will call G A°5 and its stage 0 counterpart G s°AD'5. Now if PISTG AD.5* is an R(DI) SCISTGL(z*) then 
where the first equality follows from the fact that SCISTGL(r*) SOAD.5* is the causal melded reduction of SCISTGL(z*) AD.5*; the second equality follows from Theorem AD.1; the third inequality follows from the definitions of the terms on both sides of the equals sign (and reflects the fact that PISTG SOAD.5* has but one intranodal line per node in nodes other than those in which the deaths occur); the last equality follows again from Assumption (1) and Theorem F.2. ~, r t I,,C:AI).5*,,1 it is not possible that both PISTG But, since by Assumption (2), ~'o~ [t, I"G~ "5''] 6: ~o~ t • ~ "-, ~ J, AD.5* and PISTG SOAD.5* are R(D1, z*) SCISTGL(~*). It is unlikely that PISTG AD.5* is an R(D~, z*) SCISTGL(~*) since, for example, a disabled smoker (at t2) who does not die of D2 at t 3 is more likely to have had (unrecorded) clinical lung cancer (at t 2 and t3) than a disabled cigarette smoker who dies of causes D2 (since the knowledge that a disabled individual did not die of causes D2 decreases the probability that his disability at t2 is due to, say, clinical cardiac disease, and, thus, increases the probability that his disability was due to clinical lung cancer). In contrast, it seems likely that some investigators would (at least approximately) hold the belief that, conditional on past cigarette smoking history, the subset of subjects dying of cause D2 at t3 do not differ on unmeasured risk factors for lung cancer death from the subset surviving past t3 [i.e. PISTG SOAD.5* is an R(D~, z*) SCISTGL(T*)].
If so, as promised, with A = AD.5, we have produced an example in which equations (8) and (9) hold. Nonetheless, equation (12) raises the question of whether we can construct an example in which (1) equation (8) We now construct such an example.
Suppose that Assumption (1) of the previous example is empirically false because disabled subjects are more likely to give up smoking at t2 than non-disabled subjects. We show that equation (8) with A = AD.5 may still hold [even though equation (13) will not hold with SOA as SOAD.5 (as defined above) since the suppositions of Theorem F2 are not satisfied].
Given that PISTG AD.5 is R MCISTG we have that e, i,,~At).5,,~ = ?o, (t, IGAD.5) .
equation (8) (14), we shall now derive a comparability condition that implies equation (14) holds. To do so, we shall require some new notation. Given a CISTG A and a generalized treatment G~, we let G~ also represent the PISTG that would exist if the hypothetical study represented by Gt A were performed. Given PISTG A is a CISTG, the finer PISTG G~* formed from PISTG G~ will be an SCISTGL(~*). PISTG G~, will be as in Fig. 6 when A is AD.5. Now consider the generalized treatment of SCISTGL(~*) GA°'5* "always remain/52" which we write as Ga~Ds, = (D2). The hypothetical study GG~D5, = (~) is just the study G~A°'5*.
G~5, is the PISTG shown in Fig. AD.6 . In contrast, GA°'5* is a generalized treatment of the finer PISTG AD.5* formed from PISTG AD.5.
If SCISTGL(z*) G~5* is an R(D~, ~*) SCISTGL(z*), then using Theorem AD.1,
since, by definition,
and equation (14) will hold. Therefore, letting G~ Av'5 again be the generalized treatment "smoke at t2", equation (14) will hold if, in a hypothetical study in which all subjects smoke at t2, subjects dying at t3 from causes D2 do not differ on unmeasured risk factors for death from lung cancer from subjects surviving past t3. As discussed above, it seems likely that many investigators would (at least approximately) hold such a belief.
On the other hand, suppose we let G~ D5 be the generalized treatment "smoke at t2 if |, do not smoke at t2 if 1". Then it would not be reasonable to assume that SCISTGL(z*) G~Av5. is an R(DI, z*) SCISTGL(z *) if cigarette smoking status at t2 causally influences death from D2 and D~ at t3 and t4, respectively. To see this, we note that, in the study represented by this G~a~'5., subjects dying of heart disease at t3 tend to have less exposure to cigarette smoke (since most such subjects were disabled at t2) than subjects surviving past t3, and therefore will be at smaller risk of death from lung cancer at t4 than subjects surviving past t3 (when smoking status at t2 influences lung cancer mortality at t4). Thus, an investigator might be willing to assume that he could empirically estimate ?o~(t~[G A*) with .4 = AD.5 by equation (8) only for those G ~d~~ which assign cigarette smoking status at t2 without regard to 1 status.
We now construct an example in which it would be reasonable to believe that y~, (t~ I"G, ~'') ~ ~,, (t I"G, ~''') A" = ~o,(tlGl ).
Suppose, in Fig. AD .5, 1 (~) represented cigarette smoking (not smoking) and c (6) represented exposure (no exposure) to some environmental chemical under study. Suppose interest centered on the overall effect of exposure when not controlling for cigarette smoking. Since cigarette smoking is a population risk factor for death from D~ and/)2, equation (11) will be false, with A = AD.5, for G~ "be exposed (c) at t:". In this setting it would be likely that many investigators would (at least approximately) assume that SCISTGL(~*) AD.5* was an R(D, z*) SCISTGL(z*). If so, equation (15) follows from Theorem AD.1. We now generalize equation (8) and provide conditions under which this generalization will hold. Let Q, A be CISTGs with the structure described in Appendix G of Ref. [1] . Let PISTG G ~ be the PISTG that would have been observed if the hypothetical study G ~ had occurred. Let PISTG Q(G ~) be the finer PISTG formed from PISTG G a that stands in the same relation to PISTG G ~ as PISTG Q stands in relation to PISTG A. 
AD.7. WHEN RISK FACTORS DETERMINE EXPOSURE, NON-DIFFERENTIAL MISCLASSIFCATION OF EXPOSURE CAN LEAD TO BIAS UNDER THE NULL
Suppose that OPISTG 8.1 of Ref. [1] is an R SCISTG. We can test the null hypothesis of no overall exposure effect on any individual's mortality by testing whether S(t,"G~","G~ "~'') =-0 using the G-null test algorithm. Suppose data on true exposure history E(t~) are not available. Rather, data on a misclassified measure of exposure history have been recorded for data analysis. Let Et(t~) be a subject's "misclassified exposure history" through t~. Suppose that vital status and L-history are recorded without error. It is commonly assumed that random, i.e. non-differential, misclassification of exposure does not lead to bias under the null. We now show that this assumption may be incorrect when risk factors (e.g., L-history) determine exposure. In particular non-differential misclassification of exposure may result in bias when the sharp null hypothesis holds for SCISTG 8.1 [in the sense that it may happen that et, ,,~8.~ .... ~s.~,,x ~,~,, -,i , ,-,2 j ~ 0 and therefore the G-null test for MPISTG 8.1 may have non-zero expectation] when randomly misclassified exposure data have been recorded in lieu of true exposure data.
Figures AD.7(a)-(g) each display a single representative node of an OPISTG. Specifically, we define the OPISTG depicted by a particular figure to be the OPISTG that has, at time ts, K ~-~ copies of the single displayed node (where K is the number of internodal lines arising from that displayed node). The OPISTGs depicted in Fig. AD.7(a) -(g) all represent the same study. For example, Fig. AD .7(a) depicts OPISTG 8.1 (actually the h-modified version--see p. 1444 of Ref. [1] ); the OPISTG depicted by Fig. 7(b) , which we shall call OPISTG AD.7(b), would be an MPISTG if data on both true exposure e(t,) and misclassified exposure e*(L) were recorded; and PISTG AD.7(c) is a coarser OPISTG form from OPISTG AD.7(b).
We shall say there is non-differential misclassification of exposure controlling for a measured covariate, say L(ts), if, (1) E*(ts) history is not a causal risk factor and (2) conditional on past measured covariate history L(L), true exposure history E(t~), and misclassified exposure history E+ (t,) , misclassified exposure at t, is given at random.
In a formal treatment condition (1) becomes (la) the sharp null hypothesis holds for SCISTG AD.7(c) for the joint outcomes 
E(L), L(ts) and survival history and (lb) p[L(L), D > L IG~ AD7(b) = [E~(ts), E(ts)], i] = p[L(L), D > ts IG2 AD7(b) = [E~(ts), E(ts)]. i],
